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Abstract—Homomorphic encryption enables arbitrary com-
putation over data while it remains encrypted. This privacy-
preserving feature is attractive for machine learning, but requires
significant computational time due to the large overhead of the
encryption scheme. We present Faster CryptoNets, a method for
efficient encrypted inference using neural networks. We develop
a pruning and quantization approach that leverages sparse
representations in the underlying cryptosystem to accelerate
inference. We derive an optimal approximation for popular
activation functions that achieves maximally-sparse encodings
and minimizes approximation error. We also show how privacy-
safe training techniques can be used to reduce the overhead of
encrypted inference for real-world datasets by leveraging transfer
learning and differential privacy. Our experiments show that our
method maintains competitive accuracy and achieves a significant
speedup over previous methods. This work increases the viability
of deep learning systems that use homomorphic encryption to
protect user privacy.
Index Terms—Neural Networks, Deep Learning, Homomor-
phic Encryption, Privacy, Oblivious Inference
I. INTRODUCTION
As cloud-based machine learning services become more
widespread, there is a strong need to ensure the confidentiality
of sensitive healthcare records, financial data, and other infor-
mation that enters third-party pipelines. Traditional machine
learning algorithms require access to raw data, which opens
up potential security and privacy risks. For some fields such
as healthcare, regulations may preclude the use of external
prediction services if the technology cannot provide the
necessary privacy guarantees.
In this work, we address the task of encrypted inference for
secure machine learning services. We make the assumption
that the third-party provider already has a trained model, as
is common in “machine learning as a service” paradigms.
Using cryptographic techniques, an organization such as a
research hospital or fraud detection company will be able
to offer prediction services to users while ensuring security
guarantees for all parties involved. We follow the procedure
set by previous work [29], [68] and employ homomorphic
encryption (HE) to convert a trained machine learning model
into a HE-enabled model.
Homomorphic encryption [56] allows a machine learning
model to perform calculations over encrypted data. By design,
the output prediction is also encrypted, which prevents the
authors ∗ and † contributed equally
Fig. 1: Encrypted machine learning as a service paradigm. Dashed
lines indicate data transfer. The end-user (Alice) encrypts her sensitive
data and sends it to a third-party host (Eve). Since Alice owns the
private key, Eve cannot decrypt the input nor output prediction. Eve
produces an encrypted prediction which is returned to Alice. Privacy
is preserved in the entire pipeline for both inputs and outputs.
input or output from leaking information to the model’s host.
As show in Figure 1, the model does not decrypt the data nor
is the private key needed [12].
Several challenges prevent widespread adoption of encrypted
machine learning. A major bottleneck is computational com-
plexity. Inference on plain networks is performed in the orders
of milliseconds, while encrypted networks require minutes or
hours per example [29], [38]. Also, the reduced arithmetic set
of HE prevents the use of modern activation functions [15].
necessitating the use of simpler lower-performance functions.
A. Contributions
We propose Faster CryptoNets – a method for encrypted
inference on the order of seconds. This is a significant improve-
ment over existing state-of-the-art, which performs inference
on the order of minutes. Our contributions accelerate the
homomorphic evaluation of deep learning models on encrypted
data using sparse representations throughout the neural network.
Additionally, we are able to efficiently approximate modern
activation functions. Finally, we show how this technique can
be combined with private training techniques in a plausible
real-world scenario.
By intelligently pruning the network parameters, we can
avoid many multiplication operations – a major contributor to
computational complexity. We can progressively quantize the
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remaining network parameters such that the plaintext encodings
achieve maximum sparsity. Also, given that the activation
function is the single most expensive operation of the network,
we derive an optimal, quantized polynomial approximation to
the activation function also with maximally-sparse encodings.
We empirically show a significant improvement in the runtime
of the network on MNIST. We perform additional experiments
on larger datasets to demonstrate the viability and performance
gain on practical tasks. We use a feature-extraction based
framework to reduce the number of layers requiring encrypted
computation, while using differentially private training to
achieve competitive accuracy on real-world datasets.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Related Work
Privacy-preserving machine learning models attempt to
address computation and statistical modeling of private data
[4]. Privacy is preserved when two conditions are met: (i) the
end-user learns nothing about the model and (ii) the model
learns nothing from the data [13]. Differential privacy, multi-
party computation (MPC), and homomorphic encryption are
different methods to preserve privacy.
Differential privacy allows statistics to be computed over a
dataset without revealing information about individual records
[16], [22]. A common method is to apply noise to individual
examples to obfuscate statistical differences that might be
distinguishable [52]. However, differential privacy is better
suited for the training phase. During test-time, adding noise to
a single example may change the prediction.
Secure multi-party computation enables multiple parties to
jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping their
inputs private. This has been explored using Garbled Circuits
[69] in the works of [42], [57] and [50]. These methods often
involve a high communication complexity with significant
bandwidth costs.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) was proposed by [26]
and allows anyone to compute over encrypted data without
decrypting it [51]. A weaker version of FHE, termed leveled
homomorphic encryption (LHE) permits a subset of arithmetic
operations on a depth-bounded arithmetic circuit [12]. While
HE has been explored for machine learning applications,
many works focus on simpler models such as linear [34],
logistic [18] and ridge regression [28]. CryptoNets [29] was
one of the first works to implement HE in a neural network
setting. More recently, [15] and [38] extended this to deeper
network architectures and developed additional polynomial
approximations to the activation function that leveraged batch
normalization for stability.
Other works have explored the broader use of polynomial
activation functions. [54] and [47] used a polynomial function
in the non-encrypted domain to some success. The original
theory dates back to [40] who argues that as long as the
activation function is arbitrarily bounded and non-constant, the
neural network is a universal approximator. Some prior work
even suggests that neural networks equipped with polynomial
functions have the same representational power as their non-
polynomial counterparts [25], [45]. In §IV and §V, we explore
these ideas in greater detail.
Recent works have proposed techniques that accelerate neural
network inference on encrypted data. Sanyal et. al. [59] use
sparsification techniques via binarized neural networks which
achieves a similar speedup of around 30x wall-clock time as our
technique on MNIST. Florian et. al. [11] opt for an approach
that leverages scale invariance to allow unrestricted depth of
neural networks. The technique we propose is distinct from
these approaches due to its use of the encoding scheme to
accelerate multiplicative operations, in contrast to the previous
approaches which bypass expensive operations using the sign
activation function. Our approach is advantageous in that it is
more compatible with common neural network components;
sign activation functions are known to cause difficulty with
convergence, and the scale invariant [11] precludes the use of
convolutional layers. We do not present detailed comparisons
to these works in our analysis due to these fundamental
architectural differences, and opt for a direct comparison to
CryptoNets to clearly demonstrate in which layers and with
which operations are our speedups derived from.
III. THREAT MODEL
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) [8] is a framework
where cloud providers offer machine learning training of
inference hosted on the cloud. In our scenario we will be
considering a MLaaS inference pipeline, where users send
data to a remote server and receive predictions performed
by machine learning models. The machine learning model is
pre-trained on a proprietary dataset.
A universal threat in multi-party situations is the inherent
risk of data transmission, either by interception or side-channel
attacks. This threat can be mitigated to a large extent by using
strong cryptographic and signature protocols to protect the data
in-transmission. However, a concern that is much harder to
alleviate involves the threat of the cloud host collecting and
utilizing the transmitted data without authorization [8]. In a
naive scheme, a user sends encrypted data to the cloud, but
also has to provide a key to the server to decrypt the data and
compute a output with a machine learning algorithm before
sending the encrypted prediction back to the user. The cloud
host must have access to the plain data, and it is hard to
guarantee or prove to the user that the data is not kept on the
server, where it can either be sold to third-parties or be stolen
by attackers who gain access to the data.
Homomorphic encryption provides a solution to both prob-
lems. By design, the transmitted data is protected using a strong
encryption scheme. It also enables ”oblivious inference”, where
a cloud host operates on data that it is oblivious to. If the service
provider is only allowed to compute on the encrypted data
to compute an encrypted output without ever decrypting the
data at any step, it will never have access to the plain data,
guaranteeing data privacy from the cloud provider.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
A homomorphism is a structure-preserving transformation
between two algebraic structures, which can be leveraged by
cryptosystems to allow for arithmetic operations on encrypted
data. Let Gq be a cyclic group of order q with generator g. Let
h ∈ Gq be randomly sampled as the public key. Consider the
ElGamal encryption scheme [23], which uses a map Φ : Gq →
Gq × Gq such that Φ(m) := (gr,mhr) for random r. The
map Φ preserves the multiplicative structure of the integers
such that Φ(m1×m2) = Φ(m1)⊗Φ(m2) = (g(r1+r2), (m1×
m2)h
(r1+r2)) where ⊗ is the multiplication operation in Gq ×
Gq .
The leveled homomorphic encryption scheme that we present
below has a more complex algebraic structure, and supports
both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms, but this
example can serve as a basis for understanding the role of
homomorphic encryption in our network design.
A. Notation
Let Rk denote the polynomial ring Zk[x]/(xn + 1). We
let x ← S denote uniformly random sampling of x from an
arbitrary set S, and b tqpe denote a coefficient-wise division and
rounding of the polynomial p with respect to integer moduli t
and q. Let [p]q denote the reduction of the coefficients of the
polynomial p modulo q, and let ∆ denote bq/tc.
B. Encryption Scheme.
Bajard et al. [9] proposed an encryption scheme, FV-RNS,
which is a residue number system (RNS) variant of the FV
encryption scheme. In FV-RNS, plaintexts are elements of the
polynomial ring Rt, where t is the plaintext modulus and n is
the maximum degree of the polynomial, which is commonly
selected to be one of {1024, 2048, 4096, 8192, 16384, 32768}.
The plaintext elements are mapped to multiple ciphertexts in
Rq in the encryption scheme, with q  t as the ciphertext
coefficient modulus. For any logarithm base β, let ` = blogβ qc
be the number of terms in the base-β decomposition of
polynomials in Rq that is used for relinearization.
Let χ denote the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution.
The secret key is generated as s← R3 with coefficients si ∈
{0, 1,−1}. The public key (p0, p1) is generated by sampling
p0 ← Rq and e′ ← χ and constructing p1 = [(sp0 + e′)]q . The
evaluation keys (ai, gi) are generated by sampling ai ← Rq and
constructing gi = [(ais+ ie′) + βis2]q for each i ∈ {0, ..., `}.
A plaintext m ∈ Rt is encrypted by sampling u ← R3
with coefficients ui ∈ {0, 1,−1} and e1, e2 ← χ, and letting
(c0, c1) = ([bq/tcm + p0u + e1]q, [p1u + e1]q). A ciphertext
(c0, c1) ∈ Rq×Rq is decrypted as m = [b tq [c0+c1s]qe]t ∈ Rt.
C. Arithmetic
. The addition of two ciphertexts (c0, c1) and (d0, d1) is
(c0+d0, c1+d1). The multiplication of two ciphertexts (c0, c1)
and (d0, d1) occurs by constructing
c′0 =
[⌊
t
q
[c0d0]
⌉]
q
, c′1 =
[⌊
t
q
[c0d1 + c1d0]
⌉]
q
,
and c′2 =
[⌊
t
q
[c1d1]
⌉]
q
.
We express c′2 in base β as c
′
2 =
∑`
i=0 c
′(i)
2 β
i. We then let
r0 = c
′
0 +
∑`
i=0 aic
′(i)
2 and r1 = c
′
1 +
∑`
i=0 gic
′(i)
2 , which
forms the product ciphertext (r0, r1) ∈ Rq ×Rq .
The addition of ciphertext (c0, c1) and plaintext m is the
ciphertext (c0 + ∆m, c1). The multiplication of ciphertext
(c0, c1) and plaintext m is the ciphertext (mc0,mc1).
The advantage of the residue number system variant is that
the coefficient modulus q can be decomposed into several small
moduli q1, ..., qk to avoid multiple-precision operations on the
polynomial coefficients in the homomorphic operations, which
improves the efficiency of evaluation.
D. Integer Encoder
. To encode real numbers involved in the computation, we
choose a fixed precision for the values (15 bits) and scale
each value by the corresponding power of 2 to get an integer
for use with the encoder described below. After decryption,
we can divide by the accumulated scaling factor to obtain a
real value for the prediction. The encoder consists of a base-2
integer encoder [17]. For a given integer z, consider the binary
expansion of |z| = zn−1...z1z0. The the coefficients bi of the
polynomial f(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 bix
i in the plaintext ring are zi if
zi ≥ 0 otherwise bi = t− zi.
V. METHOD
A. Sparse Polynomial Multiplication
The convolutional and fully connected layers of a neural net-
work require a substantial number of multiplications involving
both the ciphertext inputs and the plaintext parameters of the
model. Each operation involves computing the product of two
polynomials with up to n nonzero coefficients. While a brute-
force implementation would require O(n2) time to complete,
homomorphic encryption methods are able to accomplish this in
O(n log n) when certain conditions are met. Assuming that the
coefficient modulus q is chosen such that (q−1) is divisible by
2n, we can invoke the Number Theoretic Transform to achieve
O(n log n) [36].
Our contributions leverage the following insight: a substantial
improvement in efficiency occurs when the plaintext multiplier
z = ±2k for some k ∈ Z. The polynomial that encodes this
integer is bkxk, a monomial multiplier. For such parameters,
sparse polynomial multiplication [5] has been shown to use
O(n) coefficient multiplications and modular reductions (see
Algorithm 1).
B. Network Pruning and Quantization
The parameters of a neural network can be iteratively
removed and clustered without affecting accuracy. [35] de-
veloped a compression method that leverages these techniques.
Since then, new pruning and quantization techniques have
been proposed [46]. We leverage these techniques to reduce
the number of weights that contribute to the multiplication
count, and convert the weights to powers of 2, which have
Algorithm 1: Sparse Plaintext-Ciphertext Multiplication
Input: ciphertext c =
∑n−1
i=0 cix
i plaintext b = bkxk
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
Initialize j = i+ k.
if j ≥ n− 1 then
dj−(n−1) = ci(t− bk)
else
dj = cibk
end if
end for
Output: ciphertext d =
∑n−1
i=0 dix
i
sparse polynomial representations that reduce the cost of each
multiplication. Together, these lead to significant reductions in
inference time.
We first train a pruned version of the network with Dynamic
Network Surgery (DNS) [33] that incorporates connection
splicing. The remaining network parameters are quantized to
powers of 2 following the incremental network quantization
(INQ) procedure proposed by [71]. The INQ method consists
of an iterative quantization strategy to preserve the original
inference accuracy.
For each layer `, the layer’s parameters W` have a cor-
responding binary pruning mask T`. The elements of the
binary pruning mask T` get updated during gradient descent
according to a discriminative measure of parameter importance
h`, typically incorporating a magnitude-based measure s such
as s = max |W`|. We define n1 and n2, which will help bound
our quantized values for each layer:
n1 =
⌊
log2
4s
3
⌋
and n2 = n1 + 1− 2
k−1
2 ,
where k is used to restrict the set of powers for our desired
bitwidth. We use k = 5. Note that n1 ≥ n2 and
P = {−2n1 , ...,−2n2 , 0, 2n2 , ..., 2n1}
is the set of possible quantized values for the parameters of
layerW` in the network. We define a monotonically increasing
weight partition schedule using the discriminative measure h`
to progressively quantize the weights. For example, one can
quantize 50% of the weights, then 75%, then 87.5%, then
100%, retraining the other non-quantized weights at each step
of the quantization procedure.
C. Approximating the Activation Function
Using our pruning and quantization scheme from §V-B,
our next contribution lies in finding the optimal polynomial
approximation for any activation function given the constraint
that the coefficients must be a power of 2. The activation
function of a neural network is critical for convergence [30] and
has been thoroughly explored in literature [55]. With the goal
of encrypted network inference, we must find an approximation
which balances approximation error with practical usability.
Inspired by [14], we find the best polynomial approximation.
Polynomials. Let x ∈ R and let f : R → R denote
the activation function. Our task is to approximate f with a
polynomial p∗ : R→ R where p∗(x) = p∗0 +p∗1x+ · · ·+p∗nxn
subject to the constraint that each coefficient is a power of
2. Define P(2)n as the set of all polynomials of degree less
than or equal to n, such that all coefficients are base-2. That
is, P(2)n = {2a0 + 2a1x+ · · ·+ 2anxn, ai ∈ Z}. Let p be the
minimax approximation to f on some interval [−a, a]. Let pˆ be
the same as p, but with all coefficients rounded to the nearest
2k where k ∈ Z. Note, pˆ ∈ P(2)n .
Maximum Error & Minimax. The maximum difference
(i.e., error) δ between two functions g and h is δ(g, h) =
maxx∈[−a,a] |g(x) − h(x)|. This provides a strong bound on
the optimal polynomial approximation error δ(f, p∗) where
δ(f, p) ≤ δ(f, p∗) ≤ δ(f, pˆ). We state minimax problem as
follows. For a given activation function f , we seek to find the
best polynomial p∗ ∈ P(2)n such that,
δ(f, p∗) = min
q∈P(2)n
δ(f, q) (1)
subject to the constraint,
δ(f, p∗) ≤ K where K ≥ δ(f, p). (2)
Finite Number of Solutions. Let d, n ∈ N, and D =
{0, ..., d}. For ∀i ∈ D, let xi, li, ui ∈ R such that xj 6= xk if
j 6= k. We can construct a bounded polyhedron,
B =
(α0, ..., αn) ∈ Rn+1
∣∣∣∣∣ li ≤
n∑
j=0
αjx
j
i ≤ ui,∀i ∈ D

where each (α0, ..., αn) tuple represents any polynomial q ∈
P(2)n , and where αi represents the degree i coefficient. [14]
show that the number of polynomials satisfying Equation 2 is
finite if the polynomials are contained in B. They also proposed
an efficient scanning method to find the optimal polynomial
approximation p∗. Equipped with our new-found approximation
p∗, we can evaluate the effectiveness of p∗ as an activation
function in both non-encrypted and encrypted domains.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
A. Wall-clock Runtime
The runtime refers to the wall-clock time required to perform
inference on an encrypted image. This metric is the default
metric reported in previous encrypted works. However, the wall-
clock time is an imperfect metric for measuring improvements
in encrypted inference. It is hardware-dependent, varying
greatly depending on the available memory and computational
power of the device, and it is also possibly encryption-scheme
dependent, with even the same encryption algorithm being
implemented differently across libraries. In the next sections,
we introduce a metric to evaluate our methods using hardware-
independent metrics.
B. Explanation of HOPs
We report the number of homomorphic operations (HOPs)
of our inference network. This is in contrast to previous work
[15], [29], [38], which measured either throughput or wall-
clock time – both of which are highly dependent on hardware
specifications and software parallelization, and are not entirely
reliable measures. The HOPs metric is similar to the FLOPs
(floating point) metric used in scientific computing.
A homomorphic operation is defined as addition or mul-
tiplication involving a ciphertext, a plaintext, or both. The
four classes of HOPs are (i) plaintext-ciphertext addition, (ii)
ciphertext-ciphertext addition, (iii) plaintext-ciphertext multipli-
cation, and (iv) ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication. While the
exact implementation of HOPs may vary, we believe HOPs are
a hardware-independent metric for performance analysis that
enable a better comparison of models for encrypted inference,
demonstrating whether speedup occurs due to decreased number
of operations or due to algorithmic speedup.
It is important to note that the different HOPs classes vary in
cost. In general, multiplicative operations are significantly more
expensive than additive operations, with ciphertext-ciphertext
multiplications being the most costly operations found in
neural networks. Throughout our analysis, we break down our
HOPs into separate operations, following the rule-of-thumb
that reducing multiplicative HOPs outweighs the cost of adding
additive HOPs.
C. Datasets
We use the MNIST dataset of handwritten digits [44] which
contains 28× 28 grayscale images of Arabic numerals 0 to 9
(i.e., 10-class classification task), which has a standard split
of 50,000 training images and 10,000 images test set images.
While MNIST is arguably a simple dataset, it has remained
the standard benchmark for homomorphic inference tasks [29],
[38].
D. Network Architecture
The network architecture used for MNIST inference is
presented below. The architecture itself is a slight variant
of the CryptoNet [29] architecture that incorporates batch
normalization layers to support a greater variety of activation
functions. The multiplicative depth is unchanged. As shown
in Figure 2, our approximation error is minimized close
to zero. Batch normalization encourages the pre-activation
values to fit in this range. As confirmed in [15] and [38], by
reducing the variance in the input values to the activation layer,
the approximation error of the network decreases. Overall,
our model is a convolutional neural network [44] consisting
of convolutional layers, activation functions, scaled average
pooling, batch normalization, and fully-connected layers.
1. Convolutional Layer. The input image is 28 x 28. There
are 20 kernels of size 5 x 5, with stride 2, and padding of 1.
2. Batch Normalization Layer. This layer applies the batch
normalization weights and biases to each input value.
3. Activation Layer. This layer applies the approximate
activation function to each input value.
4. Scaled Average Pool Layer. This layer has 3 x 3 windows,
with a stride of 2, padding of 1, and output size of 5 x 13 x
13.
5. Convolutional Layer. This layer has 50 kernels of size 20
x 5 x 5, with a stride of 1, and zero padding.
6. Scaled Average Pool Layer. This layer has 3 x 3 windows
and a stride of 2, padding of 1, and output size of 50 x 5 x 5.
7. Fully-Connected Layer. This layer has parameters of size
1250 x 100 for matrix multiplication with respect to inputs.
8. Batch Normalization Layer. This layer applies the batch
normalization weights and biases to each input value.
9. Activation Layer. This layer applies the approximate
activation function to each input value.
10. Fully-Connected Layer. This layer has parameters of size
100 x 10 for matrix multiplication with respect to inputs.
E. Encryption Scheme
. The parameters for the FV-RNS encryption scheme are:
coefficient count of n = 8192, plaintext moduli of t1 =
1099511922689 and t2 = 1099512004609. The values of qi
are selected for 128-bit security (log q = 219). This choice of
coefficient modulus q meets the security standards established
by the Homomorphic Encryption Standardization Workshop
[6].
F. Hardware/Software Setup
. The machine used for the MNIST experiments has an Intel
Core i7-5930K CPU at 3.5 GHz with 48 GB RAM on Ubuntu
17.10. The HE library was SEAL v2.3.0-4 [17], modified by
us to support our proposed method.
G. Optimization Hyperparmeters
We provide the hyperparameter settings used to train our
non-encrypted network. A batch size of 64 was used and the
model was trained for 30 epochs. The learning rate schedule
was initialized at λ = 0.008 with a step size of 10 epochs
and γ = 0.1. The model was trained with stochastic gradient
descent with a momentum of 0.9. For the square function,
gradients were clipped at 0.25. He weight initialization was
used for the convolutional layers.
H. Dynamic Network Surgery Hyperparemeters
We report the hyperparameters of our dynamic network
surgery operations. The sparsity denotes the final fraction
of non-pruned connections over the total connections c-
rate denotes compression rate used to set the threshold of
importance before removing a connection.
We report metrics for each layer. The conv1 layer had a
sparsity of 0.1440 and c-rate of 1.5. The conv2 layer had a
sparsity of 0.0701 and c-rate of 1.65. The dense-fc1 layer had
a sparsity of 0.0568 and c-rate of 1.65. The dense-fc2 layer
had a sparsity of 0.1480 and c-rate of 1.5. All layers stopped
at iteration 10,000.
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Fig. 2: Approximation results (non-encrypted). (Top) Different approximation methods. The original activation function f(x) is plotted
with three approximations: the minimax estimate p(x), the rounded minimax estimate pˆ(x), and the our method – the quantized minimax
approximation p∗(x). (Bottom) Error of our method. Our method p∗(x) is compared to the baseline pˆ(x). The blue shaded area corresponds
to the post-batch normalization region during the training procedure.
I. Approximation Results
Prior work suggests that neural networks equipped with
polynomial functions have the same representational power as
their non-polynomial counterparts [25], [45]. Faster CryptoNets
uses quadratic activation functions that approximate modern
activations with varying degrees of complexity and expressivity.
Our proposed method allows us to construct an optimal,
quantized polynomial approximation of any arbitrary function.
In our experiments, we consider ReLU [30], Softplus [21], and
Swish [55]. We model all activation functions with a 2nd degree
polynomial. While higher-degree polynomials can decrease the
approximation error, higher-degree polynomials also require
more HOPs.
We note that [27] showed how the gradient of the square
function can be large. Their solution was to apply gradient
clipping to improve model convergence. While this is a viable
solution for recurrent networks [19], clipping gradients in a
shallow network (such as ours) may indicate model instability
and may not work for deeper variants. To avoid this, we do
not use the square activation function.
J. Polynomial Approximation Equations
We list the polynomial approximations to the Swish,
Softplus, and ReLU activation functions.
Swish
• Minimax: p = 0.12050344x2 + 0.5x+ 0.153613744
• Rounded Minimax: pˆ = 2−3x2 + 2−1x+ 2−3
• Quantized: p∗ = 2−3x2 + 2−1x+ 2−4
Softplus
• Minimax: p = 0.082812671x2 + 0.5x+ 0.75248
• Rounded Minimax: pˆ = 2−4x2 + 2−1x+ 20
• Quantized: p∗ = 2−4x2 + 2−1x+ 20
ReLU
• Minimax: p = 0.125x2 + 0.5x+ 0.25
• Rounded Minimax: pˆ = 2−3x2 + 2−1x+ 2−2
• Quantized: p∗ = 2−3x2 + 2−1x+ 2−2
K. Error Minimization
The purpose of the error minimization experiment is to
determine which activation function produces the lowest
approximation error under our quantization constraints. We
evaluate the effectiveness of multiple approximation schemes
including our method.
L. Activation Approximation Accuracy
We present Table I which contains accuracy values for all
the layers and all of the activation functions over three trials.
Activation layers we considered include ReLU, square, Swish,
and softplus, using the original function, approximated function,
and quantized approximation function.
Figure 2 shows our approximation methods applied to Swish,
ReLU, and softplus. The functions are plotted on the top
row. Most approximations are able to fit the original function
f within the interval [−1, 1]. The bottom row of Figure 2
shows the approximation error of pˆ and p∗ for different pre-
activation x values. Overall, Swish has lower error than ReLU
and softplus. If we can constrain the pre-activation values to fall
within the interval, our model will have better approximations.
Conveniently, batch norm transforms the pre-activation values
into a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance
[41] which reduces overall error of the approximation [15].
The shaded area under the curve in Figure 2 shows the
approximation error within the interval [−1, 1]. Swish has
lower error than both ReLU and softplus.
In Figure 3, we investigate the correctness of our proposed
activation approximation method by plotting the pre-activation
and post-activation values of different layers for both the
regular and approximated Swish functions. The post-activation
graphs in Figure 3 for Swish show the minimum value
between ≈ −0.28. We analytically compute the theoretical
minimum value for Swish by taking the first order derivative
f ′(x) = f(x) + (1 − f(x))σ(x). This gives us the equation
1+e−x+xe−x = 0, from which we can derive x ≈ −1.27846.
Using x ≈ −1.27846 to compute f(x), we get an approxi-
mate minimum value of −0.278465, which corroborates our
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Fig. 3: Distribution of pre- and post-activation values. (Top) The x axis denotes the pre-activation value. (Bottom) The x axis denotes the
post-activation value. (Both) The y axis denotes a normalized frequency. The original activation function is denoted by f , the baseline
minimax estimate is p, the baseline rounded minimax estimate is pˆ, and our method is p∗. BN denotes batch normalization was applied after
the convolution but before f ; this is reflected in the pre-activation value. (Bottom) Values after convolution but before applying f .
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Mean Stddev
Activation Train Test Train Test Train Test Train Test Train Test
Square 99.80 99.08 99.81 99.14 99.8 99.29 99.80 99.17 0.01 0.11
ReLU 99.65 99.20 99.59 99.14 99.62 99.05 99.62 99.13 0.03 0.08
ReLU-approx 99.57 99.07 99.60 99.14 99.58 99.07 99.58 99.09 0.02 0.04
Softplus 99.42 99.17 99.37 99.06 99.41 99.05 99.4 99.09 0.03 0.07
Softplus-A 99.34 99.05 99.39 98.98 99.38 98.98 99.37 99.00 0.03 0.04
Softplus-AQ 99.17 98.92 99.13 98.92 99.17 98.87 99.16 98.9 0.16 0.03
Swish 99.63 99.16 99.64 99.22 99.64 99.02 99.64 99.13 0.01 0.10
Swish-A 99.56 99.07 99.59 99.13 99.58 99.07 99.58 99.09 0.02 0.03
Swish-AQ 99.56 99.09 99.60 99.12 99.60 99.08 99.59 99.10 0.02 0.02
TABLE I: Multiple trials for the activation function ablation study. Values denote accuracy. Minimax approximation is denoted by A
and polynomial approximation with quantized coefficients is AQ (our method). For each activation function, three models were trained with
different random seeds. The mean accuracy and standard deviation are shown.
empirical minimum values shown in Figure 3. We find that this
minimum value remains consistent for the approximated Swish
function as well, validating the correctness of our approximation
method.
M. Detailed Breakdown of Homomorphic Operations
In Table II, we list the HOPs at a more granular level than
those presented in Table IV for CryptoNets. In Table III, we
list the HOPs for our Faster CryptoNets method. We can see
that the number of HOPS is greatly reduced for each layer and
for the overall network.
N. Comparison with Prior Work
The target use case of our work is inference on a single
encrypted image (Figure 1). We believe this approach is more
analogous to practical use cases, where the third-party host
runs asynchronous inference for individual users. Additionally,
[49] suggests that there are very significant drawbacks to
batching, including having to select more numerous and
Layer HOPs PT-CT
Adds
CT-CT
Adds
PT-CT
Mults
CT-CT
Mults
Conv-1 42,757 845 20,956 20,956 —
Act-1 845 — — — 845
Pool-1 6,845 — 6,845 — —
Conv-2 309,950 1,250 154,350 154,350 —
Pool-2 8,450 — 8,450 — —
FC-1 241,192 100 120,546 120,546 —
Act-2 100 — — — 100
FC-2 1990 10 990 990 —
Total 612,129 2,205 312,137 296,842 945
TABLE II: CryptoNets HOPs. More detailed breakdown of HOPs for
each layer. Plaintext is denoted by PT and ciphertext is denoted by
CT. Adds and mults refer to the number of homomorphic addition and
multiplication operations, respectively. Dashes indicate zero operations.
FC refers to the dense (fully-connected) layer.
restricted NTT points, forcing specific computations away from
NTT, and adding large computational cost. Works focusing
Layer HOPs PT-CT
Adds
CT-CT
Adds
PT-CT
Mults
CT-CT
Mults
Conv-1 8619 1,690 3,042 3,887 —
Act-1 5,070 845 1,690 1,690 845
Pool-1 6,845 — 6,845 — —
Conv-2 22,950 1250 10,850 10,850 —
Pool-2 8,450 — 8,450 — —
FC-1 14,354 100 7,077 7,177 —
Act-2 600 100 200 200 100
Fc-2 306 10 148 148 —
Total 67,194 3,995 38,302 23,952 945
TABLE III: Faster CryptoNets HOPs. More detailed breakdown of
HOPs for each layer. Plaintext is denoted by PT and ciphertext is
denoted by CT. Adds and mults refer to the number of homomorphic
addition and multiplication operations, respectively. Dashes indicate
zero operations. FC refers to the dense (fully-connected) layer.
on accelerating neural networks neglect batching for similar
reasons as ours ( [59] does not use batching, and [11]. uses
batching to compress messages but not to improve throughput).
Works that do batch inputs use schemes not very efficient in
practice (discussed in [49].) and do not report the batching cost.
A thorough performance analysis of batching binary vs scalar
messages across different libraries is beyond the scope of our
paper but would be a great direction for future work. As such,
we do not implement ciphertext batching techniques in this
paper, although we find it worth noting that our technique does
not preclude the use of batching techniques. [49] introduces
the Karatsuba algorithm which supports batching with binary
encoding, preserving the benefits from our method.
We refer (Table IV) for accuracy and runtime results. The
test set accuracy of our original model is 99.12%, and is slightly
reduced to 98.71% after pruning and quantization. Evaluation
of network layers in Faster CryptoNets takes 39.1 seconds
for one input, compared to 249.6 seconds for CryptoNet.
We achieve a 6.4× improvement in wall-clock time while
maintaining accuracy comparable to that of CryptoNets, which
achieved 98.95% test accuracy. We also find that our method
achieves 9.1× fewer HOPs, a larger improvement than raw wall-
clock time suggests. In Faster CryptoNets, encoding/encryption
takes 6.63 seconds, while decryption of the final layer’s
output takes 0.02 seconds. CryptoNets takes 44.5 seconds for
encoding/encryption, and 3 seconds for decryption. Our method
is 6.7× and 150× faster for these operations, respectively.
MNIST images are 28×28 pixels. Each ciphertext consists of
2 polynomials resulting in 65,544 integers (64-bit). Therefore,
our message consists of 28× 28× 65544× 8 bytes, or 411.1
MB. The output of the network consists of the 10 outputs of
the final dense layer, which gives us a result consisting of
10× 65544× 8 bytes, or 5.24 MB. In CryptoNets, the authors’
encryption scheme results in each image consuming 367.5 MB
in encrypted form. Our scheme results in comparable message
sizes to previous work.
O. Ablation Studies
Faster CryptoNets differs from the CryptoNets model in that
we use the Swish activation instead of the square function.
While both methods use a 2nd degree polynomial of the form
p(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x, our approximations use a0, a1 6= 0
for increased expressivity whereas the square function set
a0 = a1 = 0, resulting in fewer HOPs for the square function.
This is shown in Table V in the rows Act-1 and Act-2. Despite
our method requiring more HOPs for Act-1 and Act-2, we still
achieve a faster inference time than CryptoNets. At a per-layer
level, our method yields up to 16× and 11× improvements
for wall-clock and HOPs, respectively.
We compare the performance of different activation functions
when approximated with our proposed polynomial approxima-
tion and quantization (AQ) method. For MNIST, Swish-AQ
produced a test accuracy of 99.10%, while ReLU-AQ achieves
an equivalent test accuracy of 99.09%. We note the similarity of
ReLU and Swish. This finding is corroborated by the similarity
of the approximations in Figure 2. The polynomial coefficients
we calculate for the ReLU and Swish approximations turn out
to be the same, except for a constant factor.
We evaluate the inference quality and runtime of pruning and
quantization separately. Pruning produced a test set accuracy
of 98.73% and inference time of 104.7 seconds. Quantization
produced 99.06% and 162.5 seconds. When combined, pruning
and quantization produced 98.71% and 45.7 seconds. We
record the accuracies during each INQ step for both a non-
pruned network in Table VI and a DNS pruned network in
Table VII. The accuracy is largely preserved as the network is
successively quantized, demonstrating consistent preservation.
Overall, accuracy was preserved, or slightly improved in the
case of quantization.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL CORRECTNESS
We make sure our parameters are selected properly so that
our decrypted outputs are correct. We run encrypted inference
on the 10,000 image MNIST test-set, and find no accuracy
loss from our method’s plaintext results (98.71%). We also
find an precision error of around 0.05% when comparing the
plaintext and decrypted outputs. Upon further examination, we
found that his error is introduced during the floating point to
fixed point conversion prior to the encoding scheme, and that
this error does not effect the accuracy of our model.
VIII. SCALING UP
To evaluate how well our method works in real-world
settings, we implement our techniques on larger datasets. First,
we focus on CIFAR-10 as a larger practical image classification
task. Next, we consider diabetic retinopathy dataset as a
real-world medical imaging use-case where very deep neural
networks would be used in practice. For both experiments, we
upgrade our machines to n1-megamem-96 instances offered by
the Google Cloud Platform, which each have 96 Intel Skylake
2.0 GHz vCPUs and 1433.6 GB RAM.
A. FV-RNS Parameters
We use a ring dimension n = 8192 with fifteen plaintext
moduli t(j): 40961, 65537, 114689, 147457, 188417, 270337,
286721, 319489, 417793, 557057, 638977, 737281, 778241,
Criteria Faster CryptoNets CryptoNets CryptoDL-1 CryptoDL-2
PT-CT Adds 3,995 2,205 30,750 161,546
CT-CT Adds 38,302 312,137 2.31× 106 4.61× 107
PT-CT Mults 23,952 296,842 2.31× 106 4.62× 107
CT-CT Mults 945 945 1,600 64,512
Total HOPs 67,194 612,129 4.65× 106 9.27× 107
Encrypt+Decrypt Time 6.7 sec 47.5 sec 16.7 sec 16.7 sec
Inference Time 39.1 sec 249.6 sec 148.9 sec 320.0 sec
Test Set Accuracy 98.71 98.95 98.52 99.52
Message Size 411.1 MB 367.5 MB 336.7 MB 336.7 MB
Encryption Scheme FV-RNS YASHE BGV BGV
TABLE IV: Comparison of State-of-the-Art Methods (Encrypted). Plaintext is denoted by PT and ciphertext is denoted by CT. Adds
and mults refer to the number of homomorphic addition and multiplication operations, respectively. The total number of homomorphic
operations is denoted by HOPs. Message size is the size of a single encrypted image. Faster CryptoNets uses Swish-AQ while CryptoNets
uses f(x) = x2 as the activation function. References: CryptoNets [29], CryptoDL [38].
Faster CryptoNets CryptoNets Relative
Layer Time HOPs Time HOPs Time HOPs
Conv-1 3.9 8,619 30.0 42K 7.7× 4.9×
Act-1 23.4 5,070 81.0 845 3.5× 0.2×
Mid 9.1 53K 127.0 566K 14× 11×
Act-2 2.7 600 10.0 100 3.7× 0.2×
FC-2 0.1 306 1.6 1,990 16× 6.5×
Total 39.1 67K 249.6 612K 6.4× 9.1×
TABLE V: Layer-Wise Analysis (Encrypted). Wall-clock time
(seconds) and HOPs required for inference on a single encrypted
image. K denotes thousands. Act refers to the activation function. Mid
denotes a combination of pool1, conv2, pool2, and fc1, as reported
by [29].
INQ Step Partition Quantized% Accuracy
1 0.7 30% 99.00
2 0.4 60% 99.02
3 0.2 80% 98.99
4 0.0 100% 99.06
TABLE VI: INQ-only quantization schedule. Accuracies collected for
each Incremental Network Quantization (INQ) step are reported in
the Accuracy column. In each step, a progressively larger set of the
weights are partitioned and quantized, as reported in columns 2 and
3.
INQ Step Partition Accuracy
1 0.98 98.74
2 0.96 98.78
3 0.94 98.69
4 0.92 98.68
5 0.90 98.69
6 0.88 98.79
7 0.86 98.68
8 0.00 98.71
TABLE VII: DNS+INQ quantization schedule. Similar analysis is
performed on a Dynamic Network Surgery (DNS) pruned network.
Accuracies collected for each INQ step are reported in the Accuracy
column, as well as the weight partitioning in the Partition column.
786433, 925697. The values of the coefficient moduli q(j) are
selected to provide 128-bit security, such that log q(j) = 219.
Furthermore, each coefficient modulus q(j) is decomposed into
four 64-bit moduli for efficient use of the RNS variant of the
FV encryption scheme.
IX. CIFAR-10
MNIST is a relatively easy dataset, with simple machine
learning algorithms like linear regression or KNN producing
high accuracy results [64]. CIFAR-10 [43] is a more com-
plicated task where CNN’s perform notably better than other
methods. We evaluated the CIFAR-10 performance of our
method on the model used in CryptoDL [38], consisting of
eight convolutional layers, which from now on we will denote
as CNN-8.
Activation CIFAR-10 Train Acc. CIFAR-10 Test Acc.
ReLU 93.10 86.76
Square 59.97 59.88
Softplus 67.96 67.94
Swish 91.55 86.24
ReLU-A 77.95 75.99
Softplus-A 75.11 73.57
Swish-A 77.30 75.41
ReLU-AQ 77.95 75.99
Softplus-AQ 72.67 71.58
Swish-AQ 78.20 75.66
TABLE VIII: Approximation results. Minimax approximation is de-
noted by A and polynomial approximation with quantized coefficients
is AQ (our method). The training accuracy and test accuracy are
shown for CIFAR-10.
A. Activation Comparisons
We present Table VIII which contains accuracy values for all
the layers and all of the activation functions. Activation layers
we considered include ReLU, square, Swish, and softplus, using
the original function, approximated function, and quantized
approximation function. In Table VIII, we can see that training
this model with the square activation function resulted in
Layer PT-CT
Adds
CT-CT
Adds
PT-CT
Mults
CT-CT
Mults
Conv-1 36,864 460,800 479,232 0
Conv-2 36,864 13,294,908 13,313,340 —
Activ-1 18,432 36,864 55,296 36,864
Pool-1 — 18,432 — —
Conv-3 18,432 5,968,347 5,977,563 0
Conv-4 18,432 11,931,014 11,940,230 —
Activ-2 9216 18,432 27,648 18,432
Pool-2 0 9216 — —
Conv-5 9216 4,713,389 4,717,997 0
Conv-6 9,216 9,421,992 9,426,600 0
Activ-3 4,608 9,216 13,824 9,216
Pool-3 — 4,608 — —
FC-1 256 29,4644 294,644 —
FC-2 10 2560 2,560 0
Total 161,546 46,184,422 46,248,934 64,512
TABLE IX: CNN-8 HOPs. More detailed breakdown of HOPS for
each layer. Plaintext is denoted by PT and ciphertext is denoted by
CT. Adds and mults refer to the number of homomorphic addition and
multiplication operations, respectively. Dashes indicate zero operations.
FC refers to the dense (fully-connected) layer.
significantly worse test accuracy (59.88%) compared to training
this model with the ReLU activation function (86.76%),
confirming the theoretical loss of accuracy from instability of
the square function for deeper neural networks. Furthermore,
we find that ReLU-AQ and Swish-AQ offer comparable levels
of performance (77.95% and 78.20% training accuracy, 75.99%
and 75.66% test accuracy), while significantly improving on the
accuracy results that were achieved with the square activation
function.
B. Pruning and Quantization
The pruning and quantization procedure results in a model
with slightly improved accuracy (76.72%) that requires an order
of magnitude fewer HOPS for inference (6.12× 108 HOPs vs.
6.47× 109 HOPs for the baseline method). The inference time
for the model was 22,372 seconds with our method.
C. Message Size
The message size for the input image is 32×32×3×65544×8
bytes, or 1,610.8 MB.
X. MEDICAL IMAGING
Model Layers Retrained Test Accuracy
CNN-8 All Layers 63.23
DFE-RN-50 Top Block 69.89
DP-DFE-RN-50 All layers (with DP) 76.47
ResNet-50 All Layers 80.61
TABLE X: Accuracies and layers trained of each model. RN
denotes ResNet, DFE denotes delegated feature extraction, and DP
denotes differentially private. A ResNet-50 model is trained in a
standard setting for benchmarking. We observe that DFE-RN-50 has
significantly higher accuracy than the baseline CNN model and that
DP-DFE-RN-50 further increases the test accuracy close to a plain
ResNet-50 model.
Model Accuracy HOPs Runtime (s)
CNN-8 (sparse) 63.23 1.33E8 3325
DP-DFE-RN-50 76.04 3.95E8 12493
DP-DFE-RN-50 (sparse) 76.47 4.23E7 1590
TABLE XI: Comparison of performance metrics for transfer learning
vs. fully-trained models. We show that our privacy-safe delegated
feature extraction model results in both higher accuracy and fewer
HOPs/runtime, and also show that our sparsity techniques maintains
high accuracy.
Method Acc. HOPs InferenceTime (s) Speedup
Original 70.47 3.95× 108 12493 –
Pruned 70.98 4.23× 107 1924 6.4x
Pruned/Quantized 70.55 4.23× 107 1590 7.8x
TABLE XII: Ablation study of methods for improving performance
of DFE-ResNet-152
A significant limiting factor in levelled encryption schemes
used with neural networks is multiplicative depth, where only
set amount of HE operations can be performed sequentially.
Increasing the multiplicative depth by choosing larger parame-
ters incurs prohibitive cost, limiting us to neural networks with
three activation functions with our current settings. However,
state-of-the-art real world applications for deep learning like
medical imaging applications commonly use modern very deep
neural networks. To mitigate this issue, we propose the use of
models trained with transfer learning, where the computations
involved in the pretrained layers of the model can be delegated
to the client, and encryption is applied only for the evaluation
of the fine-tuned layers on the server. Using this technique,
which we call Delegated Feature Extraction (DFE), as well as
Faster CryptoNet optimizations to speed up the computation, we
achieve practical runtimes for large input sizes. An illustration
of our technique is provided in Figure 4. We show how this
technique can be improved with private training, demonstrating
a viable framework where private, efficient, and powerful
machine learning services can be provided.
A. Data
We chose the diabetic retinopathy dataset introduced by [32]
both for its clinical impact and the privacy-sensitive nature of
retinal data. The dataset consists of macula-centered retinal
fundus images primarily sourced from EyePACS and was
graded by 54 opthalmologists or opthalmologist trainees using
the International Clinical Diabetic Retinopathy scale [7] into
‘none’, ‘mild’, ‘moderate’, ‘severe’, or ‘proliferative’ ratings
for the severity of the condition.
We were able to obtain a subset of around 35,126 images of
the dataset, with a label distribution of 25,810 ‘none’, 2,443
‘mild’, 5,292 ‘moderate’, 873 ‘severe’, and 708 ‘proliferative’
diagnoses. Scans from both the left and right eye were sourced
from each patient. To compare our results to the replication
study performed by [66], we group the ‘none’ and ‘mild’ labels
to a ‘0’ label and the ‘moderate’, ‘severe’, and ‘proliferative’
labels to a ‘1’ label to reframe our problem into a binary
classification task. We randomly subsampled our dataset to
get an even split between our two labels, and following the
Fig. 4: Illustration of our proposed method for encrypted inference on retinal fundus images. The cloud provider delegates the computation of
the pretrained layers of the neural network to the end-user and evaluates the task-specific layers using the homomorphic encryption scheme.
The output of the network is returned in encrypted form to the end-user, who can decrypt to determine the prediction of the severity of
diabetic retinopathy.
Fig. 5: Illustration of retinal fundus image, graded with ‘none’ rating
for diabetic retinopathy. The right image shows the result of the
procedure for preprocessing.
guidelines recommended by [32] we use an 80-20 split for
training and test data.
Before using the retinal images with our network, we perform
some preprocessing on the raw images. The scans are scaled to
224×224×3, the standard ImageNet input size, with cropping
performed using edge detection to reframe the images. To
normalize the colors and lighting, each image is subtracted by
the local average color of each image, after which the local
average is mapped to grayscale. Random rotation is performed
on the image to make the model invariant to left/right eye
positioning and for general augmentation. Samples of the data
we use are provided in Figure 5.
B. Transfer Learning
Transfer learning is a useful way to learn an accurate model
with limited data [10], and requires retraining (fine-tuning) of
only a few of the layers of the network rather than training a
full network from scratch [39]. The base layers are commonly
trained on ImageNet [20], [58], and the final layers are retrained
on a specific proprietary dataset. This practice is common in the
healthcare setting, where large datasets are expensive to acquire
and transfer learning can simplify and/or improve the training
of the model, especially when using Machine Learning as a
Service (MLaaS) offerings from cloud computing providers
to expedite development of the application [31], [63]. As we
describe in more detail in our methods section, we can leverage
transfer learning such that only a small number of fine-tuned
layers of the network require evaluation under the encryption
scheme, while the generic feature extraction of the base network
layers is delegated to the client.
C. Network Architectures
We first implement a baseline model to train on the retinal
dataset. Our baseline model (CNN-8) resembles the CNN
network architecture presented in [38] for CIFAR-10, but is
designed to support the larger input image sizes (scaled from
32× 32× 3 to 224× 224× 3 input). It leverages an identical
multiplicative depth budget to our transfer learning models
in realizing the privacy guarantees. In particular, it contains
eight convolutional layers and three approximate activation
functions.
Modern deep neural networks like ResNet-152 [37] and
Inception-v3 [62] can contain hundred of layers. The multi-
plicative depth of the fully-trained ResNet-152 or the Inception-
v3 in [32] is at least an order of magnitude greater and
would have a prohibitively large runtime in the encrypted
setting. Additionally, there exist challenges in achieving strong
accuracy when training all layers of a deep neural network
with approximate activation functions. Our proposed model
(DFE-ResNet-152) only requires retraining of the top block of
the ResNet-152 network, which contains three convolutional
layers and three activation functions. For this top block, we
replace the ReLU activation functions in the top block with
our approximate activation function, and we use the rest of the
ImageNet-pretrained model as a delegated feature extractor on
the client.
D. Model Adaptations
We use the approximation of Swish [55] given by p∗(x) =
2−3x2 + 2−1x + 2−4 as derived in previous sections. This
approximation is required for only the activation functions in
the retrained block, which reduces difficulties with convergence
in training.
Since the encryption scheme only supports addition and
multiplication, some minor modifications are required to
support average pooling. While other work has used scaled
average pooling, in this work we encode the reciprocal of
the size of the pooling window. Furthermore, to support the
addition operation in the residual block, the scaling factor must
be encoded as well, to scale the encrypted input image for the
addition operation.
E. Client-Server Interaction
The client uses a standard deep learning framework to
evaluate the base network layers on a single RGB retinal fundus
image. Each element of the activation volume of the final base
layer can be converted to a fixed-point value and encoded using
the integer encoder described above. Each value is encrypted
on the client and transmitted to the server. The server returns
encrypted output values, which the client decrypts, converts
to floating point, and applies the sigmoid function to learn
the final predictions of the model. Given the support for deep
learning operations in major mobile platforms, the client could
even be the patient’s own mobile device, allowing for direct
service models in developing countries.
F. Evaluation Metrics
The natural alternative to our proposed technique is to have
the entire fully-trained model stored on the server and for
clients to transmit their encrypted images for diagnosis. We
want to demonstrate that our proposed technique of using fine-
tuned layers of a much deeper model has higher accuracy,
greater performance, and a smaller message size, without
compromising any security or privacy guarantees. Our primary
points of comparison will be between a standard model that
is fully-trained on our dataset and a transfer learning model
that uses pretrained ImageNet weights and is fine-tuned on our
dataset.
We will need to consider the multiplicative depth of the
models, which corresponds to the length of the deepest path
of ciphertext multiplications through the network. We keep
the multiplicative depth fixed between the two methods to
enable a fair comparison. We will also analyze the count of
homomorphic operations (HOPs), which serves as a hardware-
independent and implementation-agnostic measure of the
complexity of evaluation.
G. DP-SGD
Once concern of the earlier approach is that the users are
limited to fine-tuning only a few layers of a network. However,
training the entire model and release the upper portion of
the network as a feature extractor could lead to a privacy
risk as the feature extractor could potentially leak sensitive
information. We explore the use of private training techniques
to fine-tune the feature extractor further to improve accuracy
while preserving end-to-end privacy.
Differential privacy is a privacy construct which guarantees
that an individual will not change the overall statistics of the
population [22]. Formally, it is defined that an algorithm M
and dataset D are (, δ) private if P (M(x ∈ D) ∈ S) ≤
eP (M(x ∈ D′) ∈ S) + δ. Applying differential privacy to
neural networks helps ensure defenses against membership
inference and model inversion attacks [3]. This can be achieved
by either applying noise to gradients while training a single
model [2] [61] or by segregating data and adding noise in a
collaborative learning setting [53] [60].
DP-SGD optimization was developed by [2] and involves
adding Gaussian noise and clipping gradients of neural net-
works during training with stochastic gradient descent. It also
keeps track of the privacy loss through a privacy accountant
[48], which prematurely terminates training when the total
privacy cost of accessing training data exceeds a predetermined
budget. Differential privacy is attained as clipping bounds the
L2-norm of individual gradients, thus limiting the influence of
each example on the learning updates. We outline the DP-SGD
algorithm briefly below in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Differentially private SGD
input : Examples {x1, ..., xN}, loss function
L(θ) = 1NΣiL(θ, xi), Parameters: learning rate
ηt, noise scale σ, group size L, gradient norm
bound C.
output : θT and calculate privacy cost (, δ) using a
privacy accountant method
1 Initialize θ0 randomly;
2 for t ∈ [T ] do
3 Take a random sample Lt with sampling probability
L/N ;
4 Compute gradient;
5 For each i ∈ Lt, compute gt(xi)← ∇θtL(θt, xi);
6 Clip gradient;
7 gt(xi)← gt(xi)/max(1, ‖gt(xi)‖2C ;
8 Add noise;
9 g˜t ← 1L (Σi(gt(xi) +N (0, σ2C2I)));
10 Descent;
11 θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜t;
We use a modified DP-SGD algorithm [2] to fine-tune the
entire network, using the following techniques introduced by
[70]; warm-starting, where a public dataset is used to initialize
the weights of the model, and weights clustering, where the
same dataset is used to estimate the gradient l2 norms of each
parameter before using a hierarchical clustering algorithm to
group parameters with similar clipping bounds (in Algorithm
3). The public dataset we use is a smaller retinal scan dataset
from the STARE project [1]. We train the network privacy
settings of  = 8.0 and δ = 1× 10−5 giving us a σ value of
0.399. Finally, we retrain the layers to be encrypted as before,
leaving us with our final model (DP-DFE-RN-50).
Algorithm 3: Weight Clustering
input : k - target number of groups; {c(gi)}i -
parameter-specific gradient clipping bounds
output : G - grouping of parameters
1 G ← {(gi : c(gi))}i;
2 while |G| ≥ k do
3 G,G′ ← arg minG,G′∈Gmax( c(G)c(G′) , c(G
′)
c(G) );
4 merge G and G′ w. clipping bound
√
c(G)2 + c(G′)2
5 return G;
The accuracy and peformance metrics of our models are
listed in Table X and XI. We compare in terms of both a
hardware-independent HOPS (homomorphic operations) and
wall-clock runtime.
H. Message Sizes
The data transfer between the client and server consists
of the values for the encrypted input and the values for the
encrypted output prediction. Note that both the image and the
prediction are encrypted under multiple keys held by the client,
each corresponding to a distinct plaintext moduli t(j), which
leads the message size to be proportional to the number of
moduli used for evaluation. We used fifteen plaintext moduli
in our experiments.
As a result, the message size for the encrypted input in
our DFE-ResNet-152 method is 15 × 2 × 2048 × 7 × 7 ×
8192×4×8 bytes (789.2 GB), corresponding to the encryption
of the 2048 × 7 × 7 activation volume. The message size
for the encrypted input in our CNN-8 baseline method is
15 × 2 × 224 × 224 × 3 × 8192 × 4 × 8 bytes (1183.8 GB),
corresponding to the encryption of the 224 × 224 × 3 input
image. The message size of the encrypted output is identical
in each case: 15× 2× 1× 8192× 4× 8 bytes (7.9 MB).
Since the input is transformed to a representation with a
smaller dimensionality in the transfer learning method, the cost
of data transfer is reduced by 1.5x. While the message size
is significant in both cases, we note that ciphertext batching
techniques can amortize the cost of encrypted inference when
a user wishes to request predictions on multiple images. In the
case of diabetic retinopathy detection, this could correspond to
predictions for both the left and right eye, or predictions for
images of multiple patients of a healthcare provider.
I. Experimental Correctness
We validate on 100 images of our CIFAR-10 and Retina
experiments to ascertain the correctness of our decrypted
outputs. Once more, we find around 0.05% error due to the
floating/fixed point conversion.
J. Overall Comparison
In a direct comparison between the baseline CNN-8 model
and our transfer learning DFE-RN-50 model, we observe
an across-the-board improvement. DFE-RN-50 has higher
accuracy, significantly reduces both the count of HOPs and
measured runtime, and produces smaller message sizes than
our baseline model. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the
sparsity-based optimization techniques to reduce computation
time (7.8x speedup). We also show how other privacy concepts
like differential privacy can be used to further improve the
performance of our feature extraction architecture as we can
see with the improved accuracy of DP-DFE-RN-50. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of
homomorphic encryption and neural networks on a real-world
medical imaging dataset.
XI. DISCUSSION
Encrypted inference is not a panacea for private machine
learning. It has some obvious constraints the paper touches on in
several sections, including the computational cost and network
depth limitations. Additionally, it does not cover the problem
of private training and of defending against machine learning
attacks. The encrypted inference paradigm is still vulnerable
to black box attacks, as it still returns encrypted outputs that
are otherwise unaffected. For example, membership inference
[24] and model stealing [65] attacks can be performed with
only access to the outputs of the model.
XII. CONCLUSION
Personal privacy is increasingly under threat in the modern
digital age, and machine learning models continue to fuel the
appetite for more invidual data and information. Homomorphic
encryption holds great promise due to the security guarantees
it can provide against both eavesdroppers and service hosts.
Unlocking its potential will require reducing the high overhead
of arithmetic operations prevalent in neural networks.
In this work, we introduced and evaluated techniques for
accelerating CryptoNets [29]. The fundamental approach to our
method is to leverage sparsity by using (i) efficient polynomial
approximations for the activation functions and (ii) pruning
and quantization that is tailored to the encryption scheme for
significant performance gains. We show that our method, Faster
CryptoNets, is faster than CryptoNets without much loss of
test set accuracy.We also demonstrate how our technique can
be deployed in a privately trained feature extraction setting,
possibly inspiring future avenues of work where different
privacy concepts can be combined to deliver an end-to-end
privacy safe training and inference pipeline. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first implementation of homomorphic
encryption on a real-world medical imaging dataset.
Recent developments can produce even greater improve-
ments. Structured sparsity [67], filter-level pruning methods
[46], and efficient batching scheme and hardware acceleration
techniques [49] could further accelerate evaluation of deeper
networks. In particular, more optimal encoding schemes could
help reduce the message sizes of the encrypted data and provide
more efficient parameters for the encryption scheme. We hope
this work will inspire future lines of research in efficient and
privacy-safe machine learning.
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